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1)Cheol Park**
Dewatripont and Tirole showed (for the first time) that a mix of debt and equity is optimal and thus 
provided justification of the most commonly observed capital structure. Using Diamond framework, this note 
simplifies their model and shows that the main reason why debt-equity mix is optimal is not the divergence of 
attitude towards risk between shareholders and debtholders as claimed in their papers. It is rather the flexibility 
debt contract affords in allocating control rights and incentives to liquidate the firm.
I. Introduction
During the 1980s traditional capital structure theories gave rise to a more general question 
of security design. Studies of security design since the 1980s have produced several interesting 
results and have deepened our understanding. However, these studies were most successful in 
the area of hybrid securities such as convertible bonds (see for example, Brennan and Schwartz 
(1987) and Stein (1992)). They were not equally successful at explaining the most commonly 
observed securities and capital structure, which are a mix of straight debt and common stock. 
In short, literature on security design so far has failed to produce a convincing model where a 
mix of debt and equity emerges as the optimal solution to the security design problem. 
The dominant model for the optimality of debt contract is the costly state verification model 
of Townsend (1978). Yet, this model assumes that debtholders have no information about firm’s 
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cash flows without conducting costly state verification. Because of that assumption, the same 
model cannot be used to prove the existence of (outside) equity along with the debt contracts. 
If we assume that investors have some information about the firm cash flow, so that equity 
contract can be used, then we will see the optimality of debt contract disappear.
In this regard, papers by Dewatripont and Tirole (1993, 1994a), which later expanded to 
be a monography on regulation of banks (Dewatripont and Tirole (1994b)), are remarkable 
because they identified an environment where a mix of debt and equity turns out to be optimal 
even though it is not uniquely optimal. As is well-known, debtholders become more averse 
to risk and equity holders develop love for risk once borrowing and lending relationship is 
established. In their model, it is this difference in attitudes toward risk that the two contract 
should be used together. This divergence of risk attitude sometimes seems puzzling because it 
makes the two group of stakeholders have different perspectives on their firm. Dewatripont and 
Tirole showed that contrary to this general perception, the divergence of attitudes toward risk 
is exactly what brings them together to support the firm. Different situations require different 
actions, and different actions come from different attitudes towards risk. When things are going 
well, the firm needs a risk-loving stakeholders to make decisions, and when things are going 
badly, the opposite is true. This is why the firm needs both the equityholders and debtholders. 
In this note, we are trying to show that while the divergence of attitudes toward risk is 
important, it is not the main reason why a mix of debt and equity is optimal in their model. 
It is rather the adjustability of the size of debt contract that can induce the optimal behavior 
of the manager. Furthermore, we also show that it is not too much risk-aversion of the 
debtholders that makes them liquidate the project excessively. It is rather because debt is small 
relative to the total size of the firm. To make our point, we use their model and combine it 
with a simplified model of cash flows used by Diamond (1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1993a, 1993b) 
in a series of papers on the structure of debt contracts.
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II. Model 
A risk-neutral manager 1) needs outside finance for his project. He is allowed to use any 
financial contracts he sees fit. There are three dates. At date 0, financial contracts are drawn, 
and at date 1, more information becomes available, and liquidation/continuation decision is 
made based on new information. At date 2, cash flows are realized and distributed according to 
the financial contracts signed at date 0. There is no interim cash flow at date 1.
At date 0, after the contract is signed, the manager chooses his effort level e. Following 
Dewatripont and Tirole, we assume that there are only two levels of effort, a lower level of 
effort  and a higher level of effort  with  ‹ . We assume that the higher level of effort costs 
the manager  while the lower level of effort is costless: . So, if other things 
are equal, the manager prefers not to work hard.  
The effort level is important because it determines the probability distribution of the final 
cash flows at date 2. To emphasize the role of divergent attitude towards risk, Dewatripont and 
Tirole had to assume a rather complicated form for the probability distribution of the final 
cash flow. Here, we adopt the Diamond framework and use a very simple form of cash flows. 
We assume that the date 2 final cash flows can take one of the following two forms. 
Safe cash flow: yields X for sure
Risky cash flow: yields X with probability π ∈ (0, 1) and 0 with probability (1-π)
The probability of the safe cash flow is a random variable  ∈[0,1]. The managerial effort e 
determines the probability distribution of this random variable . Specifically, we assume:
Assumption 1: Under , the density of  is g(z) while under , the density is f (z). High 
1)   Dewatripont and Tirole call this person a manager instead of an entrepreneur mainly because the 
person has no equity stake. This assumption of zero equity stake plays a crucial role in their model.
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effort  is better than low effort  in the following sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio 
Property:
ℓ( )≡   is increasing in z
The monotone likelihood ratio property is similar to the comparative advantage in economic 
theory. A low level of effort is more likely to induce a lower cash flow while a high level of 
effort is more likely to generate a higher cash flow at date 2. 
At date 1, the random variable  is realized and becomes public knowledge, but the effort 
level e is not verifiable. Thus contracts contingent on the realization of  are feasible while 
contracts contingent on e are not.2) After observing the realized value z, investors may 
renegotiate with the manager on terms of the contract. Depending on the outcome of the 
renegotiation process, the project will either be liquidated for the liquidation value L, or will 
be continued. It is assumed that a safe cash flow makes the project worth continuing while the 
project had better be liquidated if it is to generate a risky cash flow:  
Assumption 2: 
A big difference between our exposition and Dewatripont and Tirole’s is that they needed 
two random variables that affect the probability distribution of the final cash flow. To make 
attitude toward risk a relevant variable, the probability distribution of the final cash flow needs 
to be subject to another level of uncertainty. Yet, in our model, that is not necessary.
III. Determination of the Optimal Incentive Scheme
Original contracts may specify actions contingent on the realization of z. Since there are only 
two possible actions (liquidation or continuation), the probability of liquidation, denoted by 
2)   Dewatripont and Tirole assumed that there are two random variables u and v, and one of the two is 
verifiable. We abstract from this complication.
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λ(z), is all we need to characterize the optimal contract. 
Dewatripont and Tirole made some assumptions regarding the renegotiation process. We 
will maintain their assumptions. First, they assumed that renegotiation involves no extra 
cost. This assumption is adopted by almost all papers on renegotiation. Second, the manager 
enjoys control rent C ›0 only if the project is not liquidated at date 1. The control rent C is 
assumed to be transferable. This assumption is made because if it is not transferable, then the 
manager has no way to influence the renegotiation outcome. If the renegotiation outcome calls 
for changes in the probability of liquidation function λ(z), outsiders must get the manager’s 
approval as well. If they fail to get his approval, the original plan (i.e., λ(z)) will be executed. 
Third, the manager is assumed to have no bargaining power. This implies that if the manager 
wants to renegotiate with outside financiers, he will have to give up all his control rent. This 
is a simplifying assumption, but it is not an unrealistic one to make when renegotiation is over 
liquidation of the project.
Let  be the probability of success of the project when the realized 
probability of a safe cash flow is z. Then, it is obvious that no matter what the original contract 
says, the project will be liquidated if and only if the realized z satisfies
Given the contract λ(z), the total value of the firm to outsiders is 
 
To understand this, note first that the total value of the project is  
because the control rent C is transferrable and renegotiation is costless. Yet, outside financiers 
cannot appropriate the full project value because they have to give the control rent to the 
manager when there is no liquidation. Under the stipulations of the initial contract, the 
manager is supposed to enjoy [ 1–λ(z) ]C of control rent. Therefore, to get the approval of the 
manager, outsiders have to give him that much of the control rent. In this sense, the term [ 1–
λ(z) ]C captures the agency costs.
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Since the distribution of  depends on the managerial effort e, outsiders’ objective is to find 
the best incentive contract λ(z) that will induce best action by the manager. For example, if 
λ(z)=1 for all z, the manager will choose the lower level of effort . In that case, outsiders will 
get . 
To make the problem worth pursuing, we make the following technical assumption. 
Assumption 3: 
To induce the manager to exert proper effort, the benefit of the control right should be 
greater than the cost of high effort. Furthermore, if C≥L, then the manager can prevent 
liquidation of the project simply by offering part of the control rent. For liquidation to happen, 
we need to assume C‹ L so that there is limit to what the manager can do to block liquidation. 
Under the assumptions, the outsiders’ problem becomes;
The problem is to minimize the agency cost AC by the choice of the function λ(z) given the 
incentive compatibility constraint. Let μ≥0 be the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint. 
Then, the Lagrangian becomes
And we have to maximize this expression (we changed the problem into maximizing -AC). 
Since the objective function is linear in λ(z), λ(z) will be either 1 or 0 with probability 1; 
there will be no randomization. First, note that at optimum, μ ›1 holds. If μ≤1, then the 
term in [・] is negative and thus λ(z)=1 is optimal for all z∈[0,1]. However, that cannot be 
the solution since it will violate the incentive compatibility constraint. So, we have μ ›1. The 
optimal solution would be:
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where z* is defined by 
For the problem to have a solution there must exist such z*; otherwise, λ(z) is either 0, or 1 
for all z∈[0,1], thereby violating the incentive compatibility constraint. As Dewatripont and 
Tirole, we assume that there exists a unique interior solution z* that satisfies this equation. 
Note also that the value λ*(z*) is indeterminate. As long as distributions do not have any atom 
at z*, this would not cause any problem.
The most significant thing about the optimal solution is that the success cash flow X and 
the liquidation value L enter neither the objective function nor the constraint. Thus the critical 
value z* is completely independent of X and L. It is determined solely by the functional form 
of the two density functions f (·) and g(·), the size of the control rent C, and the cost of efforts K. 
Furthermore, the optimal solution specifies only the allocation of the control rent through the 
liquidation decision, and it is silent about the distribution of the final cash flow X. 
The optimal solution is such that for high values of z, liquidation will not occur, and the 
manager will enjoy the full control rent. On the other hand, if z turns out to be low, the 
project will be liquidated, and the manager will lose all his control rent. Since high values of z 
are more likely under , the manager is induced to choose  under the optimal contract.
IV. Implementation by a Mix of Debt and Equity 
We now show that the above optimal incentive scheme can be implemented by a mix of debt 
and equity. 
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We first show that 100% equity cannot implement the optimal solution. An equity 
contract is characterized by the fact that its holders will get the full final cash flow and has 
control rights all the time. Suppose that only equity is initially issued to finance the project. 
Shareholders have both the right and incentives to liquidate the firm at z if and only if q(z)X ‹ 
L.3) Suppose q(z*)X ‹ L holds. Then, for z ‹ z*, there will be renegotiation of the contract and 
the project will be liquidated if and only if q(z)X + C ‹ L. Note that when z ‹ z* and q(z)X + 
C ≥ L, the project will not be liquidated, but the manager will have to give up all his control 
rent C. Thus the optimality condition will not be violated. The trouble rises when z › z* and 
q(z)X ≤ L. For these values of z, the manager will also have to give up all his control rent, but 
the optimality condition requires λ(z)=0. Therefore, when q(z*)X ‹ L, equity contract alone 
cannot implement the optimal solution. 
Now, suppose that q(z*)X › L holds. Then for z › z* and q(z)X ≥ L, there will be no 
renegotiation, and the manager will retain all of his control rent. Hence the optimal solution 
cannot be implemented. The only case where the equity contract alone can implement the 
optimal solution is when q(z*)X = L holds. Note here that equity alone cannot implement the 
optimal solution even if the corporate charter has a clause that the firm be liquidated if and 
only if z ‹ z* because the corporate charter will also be subject to renegotiation.  
We now discuss the case of a mix of debt and equity is used to finance the project. A debt 
contract is characterized by its face amount D and its covenants. In this model, debt covenants 
can be summarized by a critical value zc such that debtholders get the control rights if and 
only if z ≤zc. If z › zc, then shareholders have the control rights. Suppose that debt with face 
value D is issued to finance the project along with equity. Assume that debt has priority over 
equity. Then, debtholders have incentives to liquidate the project if and only if q(z)D ‹ L. 
Here, whether there will be liquidation or not depends on whether debtholders have the right 
to enforce their decisions and whether the manager could prevent liquidation by offering the 
control rent. 
Consider first the case where q(z*)X > L holds. In this case, chose the amount of debt so 
that the inequality q(z*)D = L holds, and set the covenant in such a way that the debtholders 
3)  We apply a tie-breaking rule that liquidation will not occur at z if q(z)X = L.
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get the control right whenever z ≤ z*. Then, since q(z)D < L holds true for all z < z*, there 
will be renegotiation, and the manager will have to surrender all his control rent. If z > z*, 
then shareholders have control rights, but they have no incentive to liquidate the project since 
it will be clear below that debtholders will get the full liquidation value, leaving nothing for 
shareholders. So, renegotiation will occur only when z < z* and only with debtholders. Thus, 
the debt contract constructed in such a way can implement the optimal solution. In the case 
of q(z*)X > L, the amount of the debt to be issued contract should satisfy the following 
condition:
As remarked above, the condition D > L ensures that shareholder have no incentive to 
liquidate the firm when z > z*. 
Now, consider the case where q(z*)X ≤ L. In this case, q(z*)D < L for all D < X. Therefore, 
the covenant of the debt contract should be set up in such a way that debt holders have control 
right only when z ≤ z*. Then, there will be renegotiation only when z ≤ z*, and the optimal 
solution can be implemented. In this case, the amount of debt to be issued is indeterminate as 
long as D ≤ X.
We have shown that a mix of debt and equity can implement the optimal solution. Note 
that the optimal solution is implemented not by direct liquidation of the project, but through 
renegotiation with the manager. Actual liquidation of the project will occur if and only if q(z)
X+C < L.     
V. Conclusion
This note has a very limited objective. That is to simplify the important result of 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993, 1994a) and clarify the role of debt. Dewatripont and Tirole 
made the divergence of attitude toward risk between equityholders and debtholders the central 
issue in the formulation. Yet, simplification of their model clearly shows that it is the easiness 
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of controlling amount of debt to be issued and the role of debt covenants in allocating control 
rights which made their result possible. Our simplification can also explain why debt contract 
has priority over equity contract, but we did not pursue that line of inquiry.
Dewatripont and Tirole’s result depends critically on the assumptions they made on 
the renegotiation process. Since the optimal liquidation decision is deterministic, and not 
randomized, they had to assume a rather extreme form of renegotiation where the manager 
has no bargaining power. Moreover, it is also assumed that the manager gets no pecuniary 
compensation from the firm’s cash flow. It is true that several papers in this literature made 
similar assumption, that does not make the assumption any more realistic. Notwithstanding 
these shortcomings, their papers are the first ones that derived a mix of debt and equity as the 
optimal securities. Obviously, more work needs to be done in this important area.
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